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Since the Three Mile Island accident, an important 
focus of pressurized water reactor (PWR) transient analy-
ses has been a small-break loss-of-coolant accident 
(SBLOCA). In 2002, the discovery of thinning of the ves-
sel head wall at the Davis Besse nuclear power plant 
reactor indicated the possibility of an SBLOCA in the 
upper head of the reactor vessel as a result of circumfer-
ential cracking of a control rod drive mechanism pen-
etration nozzle—which has cast even greater importance 
on the study of SBLOCAs. Several experimental tests 
have been performed at the Large Scale Test Facility to 
simulate the behavior of a PWR during an upper-head 
SBLOCA. The last of these tests, Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy 
Agency Rig of Safety Assessment (OECD/NEA ROSA) 
Test 6.1, was performed in 2005. This test was simulated 
with the TRACE 5.0 code, and good agreement with the 
experimental results was obtained. 
Additionally, a broad analysis of an upper-head 
SBLOCA with high-pressure safety injection failed in a 
Westinghouse PWR was performed taking into account 
different accident management actions and conditions in 
order to check their suitability. This issue has been an-
alyzed also in the framework of the OECD/NEA ROSA 
project and the Code Applications and Maintenance Pro-
gram (CAMP). The main conclusion is that the current 
emergency operating procedures for Westinghouse reac-
tor design are adequate for these kinds of sequences, and 
they do not need to be modified. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Vessel head wall thinning found in the reactor at the 
Davis Besse nuclear power plant (NPP) on February 16, 
2002, raised a safety issue regarding vessel structural 
integrity; see Fig. 1 and Refs. 1 through 4. Circumferen-
tial cracking of the penetration nozzle of the control rod 
drive mechanism (CRDM) could cause a small-break 
loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) at the pressure ves-
sel upper head in a pressurized water reactor (PWR). 
As part of participation in the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy 
Agency Rig of Safety Assessment (OECD/NEA ROSA) 
* E-mail: cesar.queral@upm.es 
project and the Code Applications and Maintenance Pro-
gram (CAMP), the Universidad Politécnica de Madrid 
has performed a broad analysis of an upper-head SBLOCA 
with high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) failed in a 
Westinghouse PWR: 
1. In the first stage, simulation of OECD/NEA ROS A 
Test 6.1 was performed and compared extensively to the 
experimental results. 
2. In the second stage, transients similar to those of 
OECD/NEA ROSA Test 6.1 were simulated with the 
TRACE model of the Almaraz NPP Unit 1 (Westing-
house three-loop design). This analysis took into account 
different accident management actions and conditions in 
order to check their suitability. 
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Fig. 1. Reactor vessel head degradation location; Davis Besse NPP (from http://www.nrc.gov). 
II. EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES RELATED 
TO SBLOCA SEQUENCES 
In this kind of sequence, i.e., SBLOCA with HPSI 
failed, the operators must follow several emergency op-
erating procedures (EOPs). The main tasks of the EOPs 
corresponding to the Westinghouse reactor design are 
described in Fig. 2 and Ref. 5: 
1. Whenever there is a reactor SCRAM, EOP E-0 
(i.e., reactor TRIP or safety injection) must be started. In 
step 22, the reactor coolant system (RCS) integrity is 
checked, and if it is not intact, there is a transition to EOP 
E-l (loss of reactor or secondary coolant). 
2. In EOP E-l, step 1, the operator checks if the 
reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) should be stopped (they 
will be stopped by the operator if there is at least one 
HPSI pump running and loss of subcooling). 
3. Following EOP E-l, step 11, the operator checks 
the primary pressure, and if it is not below —15 bars (the 
exact value depends on the NPP), there is a transition to 
EOPES-1.2 [post-loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) cool-
down and depressurization]. 
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Fig. 2. Main steps of the EOPs related to an upper-head SBLOCA. 
4. In EOP ES-1.2, the operator cools and depressur-
izes the primary system, opening the steam dump valves, 
or if that is not possible, the operator opens the steam 
generator relief valves at the secondary side, making sure 
that the cooling of the RCS is close to 55 K/h. 
It is important to comment on some considerations with 
respect to the two main operator actions: RCP trip and 
cooling and depressurizing the primary system by means 
of steam generators: 
1. RCP trip: The need to review the manual RCP trip 
conditions during an SBLOCA was an issue that arose as 
a result of the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. Wes-
tinghouse analyzed this issue for SBLOCA sequences 
with and without HPSI (see Refs. 6, 7, and 8), and the 
main conclusions were the following: 
a. If the HPSI is available, the RCP must be tripped 
at the beginning of SBLOCA sequences in order 
to avoid worse consequences following a de-
layed RCP trip. 
b. If the HPSI is not available, it is better to not 
trip the RCPs in order to cool the core with a 
high mass flow. 
In other designs like the current Siemens reactors, 
EPR and APIOOO, there is an automatic trip coincident 
with the safety injection system (SIS) demand, regard-
less of HPSI availability.911 In the French reactor design 
there is also a manual trip in the A1.2 procedure (corre-
sponding to the LOCA sequence).12 
2. Primary-side cooling: If the RCS is in saturation 
conditions, it is possible to obtain the equivalence of a 
55 K/h cooling rate (following EOP ES-1.2, as men-
tioned earlier) in bars per hour, from Figs. 3 and 4 (it 
must be noted that this equivalence is valid only in sat-
uration conditions). In other designs like the current Sie-
mens reactors and EPR, the cooling rate during an 
SBLOCA is 100 K/h, and cooling is performed automat-
ically by the protection system.910 In the APIOOO there is 
no secondary-side depressurization, and the primary-
side depressurization is performed using an automatic 
depressurization system (ADS) with four stages, which 
is necessary when the core makeup tank is below 70% 
(Refs. 11 and 13). In the APIOOO design, EOPs direct the 
operator to actuate the normal residual heat removal sys-
tem (RHRS) in order to avoid the actuation of the fourth 
ADS stage.14 For the French reactor design, the operators 
must follow procedure Al. 1 (small primary system break) 
during an SBLOCA. The objective of this EOP is to cool 
the RCS with the steam generator to conditions that en-
able implementing the RHRS, which it is similar to EOP 
ES-1.2. 
If the accident management actions included in EOP 
E-0, EOP E-l, and EOP ES-1.2 are not enough to avoid 
core damage or if there is an error or delay in operator 
actions, then it is possible to get inadequate core cooling 
(ICC) conditions; see Refs. 15 through 20 for more de-
tails. In this case the operators must follow Status Tree 
F.0.2 (core cooling) and EOP FR C.l (response to ICC) 
and EOP FR C.2 (response to degraded core cooling). 
The status tree that is related to the critical function of 
core cooling is F.0.2 (Westinghouse design); see Fig. 5. 
This status tree directs the operators to the function re-
covery guideline (FRG) that must be used depending on 
the values of several parameters. In this case Status Tree 
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Fig. 4. Primary depressurization rate in saturated conditions 
for a cooling rate of 55 K/h. 
the Westinghouse reactor design, which is a differential 
pressure measuring system for determining the collapsed 
water level in the reactor vessel; see Refs. 23 and 24 for 
more details. In other reactor designs electrical resis-
tance detectors at different vessel levels are used instead 
of the RVLIS (Refs. 25 and 26). Both instrumentation 
systems, CET and RVLIS, are part of the ICC instrumen-
tation system, which has been required since the TMI 
accident in 1979 (Ref. 15). 
In EOP FR C.2, the operator will cool down the 
primary side with a maximum cooling rate of 55 K/h (as 
in EOP ES-1.2), and in EOP FR C.l, the operator will 
fully open all secondary-side relief valves. In several 
simulations it has been observed that the cooling rate 
with full opening is near 300 K/h. 
The generic probabilistic risk analysis of the French 
reactor design (see Ref. 12) mentions that in the event of 
failure of HPSI during LOCA sequences, the operator 
will trigger an accelerated cooling by the steam generator 
(task included in procedure Ul), making it possible to 
attain low-pressure safety injection (LPSI) operation con-
ditions (similar to EOP FR C.l). The time available for 
this operation is estimated to be 1 h. 
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Fig. 5. Status tree related to the FRG of core cooling (i.e.. 
F.0.2). 
F.0.2 selects the FRG EOP FR C.l or EOP FR C.2 de-
pending on the core exit thermocouple (CET) tempera-
tures (see Refs. 21 and 22) and the vessel level, measured 
by the reactor vessel level indicator system (RVLIS) in 
III. LARGE SCALE TEST FACILITY: 0ECD/NEA ROSA 
TEST 6.1 
The Large Scale Test Facility (LSTF) is a full-
height, full-pressure, 1/48 volumetrically scaled simu-
lator for a Westinghouse-type four-loop [3423-
MW(thermal)] PWR with primary and secondary coolant 
systems including an electrically heated simulated core, 
emergency core cooling systems (ECCSs), and control 
systems for accident management actions; see Ref. 27 
and Fig. 6 for more details. The maximum core power 
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Fig. 6. Large Scale Test Facility. 
of 10 MW is equivalent to 14% of the 1/48-scaled PWR 
rated power covering the scaled PWR decay heat after 
the scram. 
The Universidad Politécnica de Madrid has been 
working with the ROS A/LSTF TRACE model since Feb-
ruary 2006 (Refs. 28, 29, and 30). The TRACE model is 
based on the TRAC-PF1 model presented by the Japan 
Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) to the partici-
pants of the OECD/NEA ROSA project. The main tasks 
performed in translating and modifying the model are the 
following: 
1. The old STGEN component was translated to the 
TRACE model as a set of components (TEEs and PIPEs), 
conserving volumes and lengths. The steam generator 
recirculation ratio was adjusted. Later, a new steam gen-
erator model with nine different heights of tubes was 
developed. 
2. The old VESSEL component was translated to 
the TRACE model, and the temperature in the upper head 
of the vessel was adjusted to the measured one (—586 K). 
The REFLOOD model was activated. 
3. The total mass flow was adjusted in the primary 
loops using friction coefficient (FRIC) parameters and 
the rated head in the RCP The mass flow rate from the 
downcomer to the upper head of the vessel was adjusted 
to the specified one (0.3% of the downcomer vessel total 
mass flow). 
4. Volume-versus-height plots were checked with 
respect to the facility data, and all the volume and height 
discrepancies were corrected. 
5. A new two-dimensional model of the pressurizer 
was created to avoid excessive cooling in the upper cells 
of the model during long quasi-steady-state transients, 
which was a problem with the earlier model. Also, sta-
bilization of the pressurizer level and pressure control 
systems was included to adequately fix the steady state. 
Finally, new, more detailed proportional and base heaters 
were also added. 
6. Heat losses and pressure drops of the whole model 
were adjusted. 
7. The OFFTAKE model was activated in the con-
nections of the valves that simulate breaks in different 
localizations of the LSTF 
8. An animation mask was created with the SNAP 
application; see Fig. 7. This mask allows videos of the 
simulations to be performed, which allows the transient 
behavior to be easily interpreted. 
The ROSA/LSTF TRACE model has 178 thermal-
hydraulic components (2 VESSEL, 45 PIPE, 8 TEE, 2 
Fig. 7. SNAP mask of ROSA/LSTF. Void fraction in primary and secondary sides during an upper-head SBLOCA. 
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1013 SIGNAL VARIABLES, 167 CONTROL BLOCKS, 
and 20 TRIPS; see Fig. 8. 
The OECD/NEA ROSA project, which started in 
2005 by agreement among the Japan Atomic Energy 
Agency (JAEA), OECD/NEA, and 13 member coun-
tries, has conducted an SBLOCA test (Test 6-1, SB-
PV-09 at JAEA). This test simulates a PWR vessel 
top-break SBLOCA assuming a total failure of the HPSI 
with a break size equivalent to a 1.9% cold-leg break; see 
Table I for more details on the sequence. The objective of 
the test is to study the effect of accident management 
action and to provide integral test data for assessment 
and development of advanced analytical codes. 
OECD/NEA ROSA Test 6-1 was conducted on No-
vember 17, 2005, using the LSTF at JAEA. At the be-
ginning of the test, a rather large break and core uncovery 
caused fast primary depressurization, which resulted in 
the primary pressure being far lower than the steam 
generator secondary-side pressure when an accident man-
agement action was initiated by fully opening of the 
steam generator relief valves following the detection of 
high CET temperature (T > 623 K). The peak CET 
TABLE I 
Description of OECD/NEA ROSA Test 6.1— 
Chronology of Major Events and Procedures 
Event 
Break valve open 
SCRAM signal (low primary pressure) 
Core uncovery 
Beginning of secondary-side depressurization 
due to high CET temperature 
Initiation of core protection system due 
to high cladding temperature 
Accumulators' injection 
LPSI starts 
End of experiment (valve closed) 
Time 
(s) 
0 
26 
«800 
1090 
1200 
1300 
2900 
3266 
temperature appeared at the center. The accident man-
agement action was ineffective in the early stage until 
the steam generator secondary-side pressure decreased 
to the primary pressure. The LSTF core protection sys-
tem automatically decreased the core power to 10% of 
the decay power level as the maximum fuel rod surface 
temperature exceeded the core protection limit (T > 
958 K). 
As can be seen in Figs. 9 through 13, the test was 
correctly simulated with the TRACE model. The primary 
and secondary pressures match the experimental result 
fairly well. The core uncover behavior and the CET tem-
perature evolve the same as in the test. There was only a 
little delay in primary pressure compared to the test re-
sults. The data are shown normalized because they are 
proprietary until April 2012. Other groups participating 
in the OECD/NEA ROSA project also simulated this test 
and, in general, obtained good results.3132 
The results of OECD/NEA ROSA Test 6.1 showed 
that the accident management action of manual depres-
surization in the secondary system was effective, but it 
was late, because the temperatures at the core increased 
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TABLE II 
Upper-Head SBLOCA Experiments Performed in LSTF 
Test 
SB-PV-02 (equivalent to 0.5% of 
cold-leg break) 
SB-PV-07 (1%, half-size of one 
CRDM nozzle ejection) 
SB-PV-08(0.1%) 
SB-PV-09 (1.9%) 
OECD/NEA ROSA Test 6.1 
Program 
ROSA-IV, 
May 1987 
ROSA-V 
June 2005 
ROSA-V 
October 2005 
ROSA-V 
November 2005 
Conditions 
Effect of high-pressure-injection initiation 
was studied when temperature at hot leg 
reached Tsat + 10.0 K. 
Operator actions of high-pressure-
injection recovery were initiated when 
temperature at CET reached 623 K. 
Steam generator depressurization (full 
opening of reactor vessel) was initiated 
when temperature at CET reached 623 K. 
Steam generator depressurization (full 
opening of reactor vessel) was initiated 
when temperature at CET reached 623 K. 
Final State 
Heatup; quenched. 
Heatup; quenched 
Heatup; quenched 
Heatup; power trip. 
to unexpectedly high values. This issue was of concern 
for people involved in this test because this effect was 
previously detected in some former upper-head SBLOCA 
tests in LSTF (see Table II and Refs. 33 through 39), but 
the delay to detect core uncovering was never found to be 
so long [—230 s (Ref 37)]. This large delay made the 
accident management action ineffective because it was 
implemented too late in the transient. 
As a result, at a May 2007 ROSA meeting, several 
technical reports and presentations raised concerns with 
the CETs and their role in the accident management of 
OECD/NEA ROS ATest 6.1 (Ref. 35). Consequently, the 
NEA Working Group on Analysis and Management of 
Accidents decided to study the problem more deeply. 
Many meetings took place between 2008 and 2009 
(Refs. 40 through 43), but the conclusions had not been 
made public at the time this paper was written. 
In order to analyze the delay problem, the relation-
ship between clad and CET temperature evolution could 
be approximated by the linear expression ATCET = 
CATCLAD - T0. This analysis was performed by JAERI 
with several experiments; see Refs. 34, 37, and 38. The 
adjustment obtained for the upper-head tests and the sim-
ulation with TRACE are included in Table III. 
The comparison of the slopes C shows that the sim-
ulation of OECD/NEA ROSA Test 6.1 with TRACE pro-
vides larger values of the CET temperatures than the 
experimental ones. The ratio between the experimental 
and the simulated increase of CET during core uncover-
ing in OECD/NEA ROSA Test 6.1 is 0.65; see Fig. 12. 
This value was obtained from several simulations with 
different nodalizations, in which the most conservative 
value (the lowest value) was chosen. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to take into account this relationship in the plant 
applications that are described later in this paper. 
TABLE III 
Relationship Between rCET and Taad During 
the Upper-Head SBLOCA Tests Performed in LSTF 
Test 
SB-PV-02 (0.5%) 
SB-PV-07 (1%) 
SB-PV-08 (0.1%) 
SB-PV-09 (1.9%) 
OECD/NEA ROSA Test 6.1 
Simulation of OECD/NEA ROSA 
Test 6.1 
C 
1.47 
1.98 
1.96 
2.75 
1.65 
T0 
16.9 
28.1 
28.9 
0 
2.0 
IV. ALMARAZ-1 TRACE MODEL 
Almaraz NPP has two PWR units; it is located in 
Cáceres (Spain) and is owned by a consortium of three 
Spanish utilities: Iberdrola (53%), Endesa (36%), and 
Gas Natural Fenosa (11%). The commercial operation 
started in April 1981 (Unit I) and in September 1983 
(Unit II). Each unit is a Westinghouse three-loop PWR. 
The nominal power is 2739 MW(thermal) and 977 
MW(electric), respectively. The original Westinghouse 
steam generators were replaced between 1996 and 1997, 
and since then, three Siemens KWU 61W/D3 steam gen-
erators have been used. The RCPs, designed by Westing-
house, are single stage and centrifugal. The auxiliary 
feedwater system (AFWS) consists of one turbine-driven 
pump and two motor-driven pumps. 
The Almaraz-1 TRACE model has 255 thermal-
hydraulic components (2 VESSEL, 73 PIPE, 43 TEE, 54 
VALVE, 3 PUMP, 12 FILL, 33 BREAK, 32 HEAT 
STRUCTURE, and 3 POWER components), 740 SIGNAL 
fflnttíl! 
<: 
Fig. 14. Simplified scheme of the Almaraz-1 TRACE model. 
VARIABLES, 1671 CONTROL BLOCKS, and 58 TRIPS; 
see Fig. 14. 
Regarding the primary and secondary circuits, the 
following components have been modeled: 
1. reactor vessel, modeled by a VESSEL component 
(Fig. 15), which includes the core region, guide 
tubes, support columns, core bypass, and the 
bypass to the vessel head via the downcomer and 
via guide tubes 
2. The nuclear core power is modeled with axial 
cosine power shape distribution. The core power 
is distributed among nine HEAT STRUCTURE 
components, with one HEAT STRUCTURE per 
sector. 
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Fig. 15. Comparison of the vessel nodalizations of Almaraz-1 and ROSA/LSTF models. 
3. primary circuit, including steam generators and 
pressurizer in loop 2 (containing heaters, relief/ 
safety valves, and pressurizer spray system) 
4. chemical and volume control system (CVCS) 
5. ECCS: safety injection system and accumulators 
6. steam lines up to the turbine stop valves, with the 
relief, safety, and isolating valves 
7. steam dump with eight valves 
8. feedwater system and AFWS. Feedwater pumps 
coast down, and auxiliary mass flows are in-
cluded as boundary conditions. 
The control, protection, and engineering safeguard 
systems and signals modeled are the following: 
1. pressurizer level control, which includes the CVCS 
isolating discharge signal, the CVCS charge flow, 
and heaters 
2. pressurizer pressure control, which includes pro-
portional and backup heaters, spray lines, and pilot-
operated relief valves (PORVs) 
3. steam generator level control system 
4. steam dump control 
5. turbine control 
6. protection and engineering safeguard system sig-
nals, which include the emergency shutdown sys-
tem (SCRAM); safety injection; pressurizer safety 
valve logic; AFWS activation; relief, safety, and 
isolating valve logic of steam lines; normal feed-
water system isolation; turbine trip; and pump 
trip. 
This model has been validated with steady and tran-
sient conditions and verified with a large set of 
transients.4451 
In these kinds of transients, it is necessary to include 
the RVLIS to measure the water level in the reactor ves-
sel as it is measured in the plant. In Almaraz-1 there are 
two calibrations: a dynamic calibration (with all RCPs 
running) and a static calibration (all RCPs tripped). A 
model for these RVLIS measures was implemented in the 
Almaraz-1 model taking into account the descriptions 
and model of several references: Refs. 52, 53, and 54. 
Figure 15 shows the relationship among several values of 
the RVLIS and heights in Almaraz-1 and as compared to 
the ROSA/LSTF vessel model. 
V. UPPER-HEAD SBLOCA WITHOUT HPSI: 
REFERENCE CASE 
In this first analysis the secondary-side cooling is not 
taken into account in order to check if it is necessary to 
avoid high cladding temperatures. 
In this first group of simulations, several conditions 
were imposed in the model: 
1. The break area is adjusted to the CRDM section 
of Almaraz-1 [6.985 cm (2.75 in.)]. 
2. No HPSI is available. 
3. All accumulators are available (3/3). 
4. One train of LPSI is available. 
5. The main steam isolation valve is closed by high 
pressure inside containment. 
6. There is no secondary-side depressurization. 
7. An upper-head SBLOCA takes place at t = 4650 s. 
8. There is no RCP trip. 
The results show that the reference case needs secondary-
side depressurization in order to avoid high cladding tem-
peratures; see Figs. 16 and 17. 
Therefore, we decided to perform a broad spectrum 
of sensitivity analyses with respect to several variables 
in order to find the most limiting cases: break area, 
discharge coefficient, break localization within the 
upper head, friction factors in the accumulators' exit, 
upper downcomer area, steady-state upper-head mass 
flows, number of accumulators available, and RCP trip 
delay. 
The results of peak cladding temperature (PCT) sen-
sitivity cases show the following: low sensitivity to break 
location, friction factors at the accumulators' exit, and 
steady-state upper-head mass flows; medium sensitivity 
to discharge coefficients and upper downcomer area; and 
high sensitivity with respect to break area size, RCP trip 
delay, and number of accumulators available. 
Taking into account the results of the sensitivity analy-
sis, we decided to carry out two analyses: first, an exten-
sive sensitivity analysis with respect to the break area 
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size and RCP trip delay (with all accumulators available)— 
Sees. VI, VII, and VIII—and second, a sensitivity analy-
sis with respect to the number of accumulators available— 
Sees. IX and X. 
VI. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS WITH RESPECT TO THE 
BREAK AREA SIZE AND RCP TRIP DELAY 
An extensive analysis with respect to the break area 
size and RCP trip delay (with all accumulators available) 
was performed, as shown in Figs. 18, 19, and 20. The 
results shown in Table IV and Fig. 19 point out that all 
cases lead to core damage (PCT > 1477 K). The clad-
ding temperature growing rate since core uncovering 
(«* 1 K/s) is similar to the experimental values from the 
<*• 50 
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PKL, LOFT, ROSA, PSB, and NEPTUN tests (from 0.2 
to 2 K/s); see Refs. 21, 38, 39, and 55 through 58. 
These analyses confirm the necessity of secondary-
side depressurization at 55 K/h cooling of the primary 
circuit in order to avoid core damage. Therefore, a new 
analysis including secondary-side depressurization was 
performed. This analysis is described in Sec. VII. 
VII. UPPER-HEAD SBL0CA WITHOUT HPSI: CASES WITH 
RCS COOLING RATE OF 55 K/h 
As was mentioned earlier, the operator follows EOP 
E-0, EOP E-l, and EOP ES-1.2 in this kind of se-
quence. In EOP E-l, step 11, the operator checks the 
primary pressure, and if it is not below 15 bars, there is 
TABLE IV 
Time to Damage in Upper-Head SBLOCA Without Depressurization 
Break Diameter 
2.5 cm (1 in.) 
5.1 cm (2 in.) 
6.985 cm (2.75 in.) 
RCP Trip Delay from SCRAM (s) 
0 
29120 
13 938 
14192 
5350 
27343 
14179 
13 296 
7350 
27366 
15536 
13 874 
9150 
27422 
16630 
13 641 
10250 
27438 
16094 
16 222 
No Trip 
42171 
15 966 
13 790 
a transition to EOP ES-1.2. In EOP ES-1.2, the operator 
will cool and depressurize the primary system, opening 
the relief valves in the secondary side, making sure to 
control that the primary cooling is close to 55 K/h. The 
time needed for the operators to arrive at EOP ES-1.2 is 
—600 s from reactor scram.59 
The simulations were performed including a manual 
cooling control system in the Almaraz-1 model. Several 
options of this manual control have been checked similar 
to the models described in Ref. 60. After adjusting the 
parameters of all the manual control models, a propor-
tional control was selected. 
The results of these simulations are shown in Figs. 21 
through 26. The condition of damage or success for all 
these transients is included in Fig. 27. The region of 
Fig. 27 in which there are damage conditions is defined 
as the damage domain of the sequence; this kind of dia-
gram is used as part of the Integrated Safety Assessment 
methodology developed by the Modelization and Simu-
lation Area of the Spanish Nuclear Safety Council [Con-
sejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN)]; see Refs. 61, 62, and 
63 for more details of this methodology. Figures 27 and 
28 show that the damage domain corresponds only to the 
cases with early RCP trip, t < 10 min, and break size 
close to maximum break size [6.985 cm (2.75 in.)] could 
lead to core damage. These results show that the present 
EOPs are adequate for this kind of sequence because if 
the operator follows these EOPs, i.e., does not trip RCP 
Time (s) 
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Fig. 22. Sensitivity to RCP trip delay with all accumulators 
available and 55 K/h primary cooling. Case with 
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Fig. 26. Sensitivity to break size with all accumulators avail-
able and 55 K/h primary cooling. Cases with RCP 
trip simultaneously with SBLOCA. Average primary-
side temperature. 
Fig. 25. Sensitivity to break size with all accumulators avail-
able and 55 K/h primary cooling. Cases with RCP 
trip simultaneously with SBLOCA. Peak cladding 
temperature. 
and perform the 55 K/h primary-side cooling, there is no 
fuel damage. 
However, if there is an operator error related to in-
adequate manual operation, it is still possible that RCP 
trip will arrive at damage conditions. Therefore, a new 
analysis has been performed for the transients that lead to 
damage conditions, and it is described in Sec. VIII. 
VIM. UPPER-HEAD SBLOCA WITHOUT HPSI: CASES WITH 
FULL OPENING OF RELIEF VALVES 
In the damage transients discussed in Sec. VII, all the 
transients included the manual actions corresponding to 
EOP ES-1.2, like a primary-side cooling rate of 55 K/h. 
Therefore, it is interesting to analyze the transition to 
EOP FR C.l. The transition to EOP FR C.l requires the 
following conditions: 
1. r C E T >921Kor 
2. rCET > 649.13 K, VL < 40%, and all RCPs tripped. 
The time of transition to EOP FR C.l corresponding 
to the transients of the damage domain of Sec. VII is 
shown in Table V and has been obtained from Figs. 29 
and 30 (not all simulated cases are shown in these 
figures). 
Some of the results of the previous damage tran-
sients with full opening of all secondary-side relief valves 
(3/3) at the time of EOP FR C.l transition (plus an as-
sumed operator delay of 60 s) are shown in Figs. 31 and 
32. In all the cases, fully opening the relief valves avoids 
the damage limit, as shown in Fig. 31. 
However, the simulated CET temperature being higher 
than the real one during core uncovering, as is described 
in Sec. Ill, must be taken into account. Therefore, we 
decided to obtain the available time to fully open all of 
the secondary-side relief valves for all the cases arriving 
at core damage with 55 K/h secondary-side cooling and 
to compare this time with the corrected transition time to 
EOP FR C.l. The corrected transition time is obtained 
taking into account that the ratio between the experimen-
tal and the simulated CET temperature for OECD/NEA 
ROSA Test 6.1 is 0.65; see Sec. Ill for more details. 
Therefore, if the values of the simulated CET tempera-
tures are corrected, a new transition time to EOP FR C.l 
is obtained; see Table VI and Fig. 33. The results show 
that there is a large margin of time between the corrected 
transition time to EOP FR C.l and the available time to 
begin EOP FR C.l. 
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Therefore, these results also show that the present 
EOPs are adequate for this kind of transient, also in the 
case of an operator mistake related to an inadequate man-
ual RCP trip. 
These results have been obtained with the availabil-
ity of all accumulators (3/3). In order to complete the 
analysis, a new sensitivity study with respect to the num-
ber of accumulators available was performed, as dis-
cussed in Sec. V. 
IX. UPPER-HEAD SBLOCA WITHOUT HPSI: CASES WITH 
FULL OPENING OF RELIEF VALVES: SENSITIVITY TO 
THE NUMBER OF ACCUMULATORS AVAILABLE 
In this sensitivity analysis the worst previous case 
with a cooling rate of 55 K/h was selected. This case 
corresponds to the sequence with a break size of 6.985 cm 
(2.75 in.) and RCP trip at the same time as the SBLOCA 
event, because the time between conditions for EOP FR 
TABLE V 
Transition Conditions to EOP FR C.l 
Break Size 
6.90 cm (2.70 in.) 
6.90 cm (2.70 in.) 
6.90 cm (2.70 in.) 
6.985 cm (2.75 in.) 
6.985 cm (2.75 in.) 
Time of RCP 
Trip from 
SCRAM 
(s) 
0 
250 
500 
0 
750 
Time (s) When 
TCET> 921.93 K 
11260 
11018 
10 984 
11223 
11475 
Time (s) When 
T C E T > 649.13 K 
6684 
6626 
6608 
9128 
9423 
Time (s) When 
RVLIS < 40% 
6478 
6436 
6406 
6421 
6728 
Transition 
Time to 
EOP FR C.l 
(s) 
6684 
6626 
6608 
9198 
9423 
Damage 
Without 
EOP FR C.l 
Accident 
Management 
(s) 
13 007 
12880 
12764 
12928 
13467 
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Fig. 31. Comparison of the cases of the damage domain with 
secondary-side cooling at 55 K/h and fully opened 
relief valves. Peak cladding temperature. 
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Fig. 32. Comparison of the cases of the damage domain with 
secondary-side cooling at 55 K/h and fully opened 
relief valves. Primary and secondary pressures. 
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Fig. 36. Sensitivity to the number of accumulators available 
and 55 K/h primary cooling. Cases with RCP trip 
simultaneously with SBLOCA. Vessel level (static 
RVLIS). 
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and 55 K/h primary cooling. Cases with RCP trip 
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Fig. 37. Sensitivity to the number of accumulators available 
and full opening of reactor vessel. Cases with RCP 
trip simultaneously with SBLOCA. Peak cladding 
temperature. 
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TABLE VI 
Transition Conditions for EOP FR C.l with Corrected CET Temperatures 
Break Size 
6.90 cm (2.70 in.) 
6.90 cm (2.70 in.) 
6.90 cm (2.70 in.) 
6.985 cm (2.75 in.) 
6.985 cm (2.75 in.) 
Time of RCP 
Trip from 
SCRAM 
(s) 
0 
250 
500 
0 
750 
Transition Time 
to EOP FR C.l 
(s) 
6684 
6626 
6608 
9198 
9423 
Corrected Transition 
Time to 
EOP FR C.l 
(s) 
9363 
9287 
9166 
9330 
9545 
Available Time 
to Begin 
EOP FR C.l 
(s) 
12877 
12626 
12108 
12448 
12173 
Damage Without 
EOP FR C.l 
(s) 
13007 
12880 
12764 
12928 
12879 
C.l transition and core damage is the smallest of all 
cases; see Table V. The results shown in Fig. 34 show that 
all cases with three, two, one, and no accumulators lead 
to core damage. Therefore, the RVLIS and CET temper-
ature shown in Figs. 35 and 36 are analyzed in order to 
obtain the transition times to EOP FR C.l; see Table VII. 
The results with full opening of all relief valves with 
these transition times show that only the case with no 
accumulators leads to core damage conditions, as shown 
in Figs. 37 and 38 and Table VII. In this case the CET 
temperatures have not been corrected, like in Sec. VIII, 
because those results have shown a large time margin of 
actuation in all cases except in the case of no accumulators. 
X. UPPER-HEAD SBL0CA WITHOUT HPSI: CASES 
WITH FULL OPENING OF RELIEF VALVES: 
MODIFIED STATUS TREE F.0.2 
In the previous sensitivity analysis with respect to 
the number of accumulators available, it was found that 
TABLE VII 
Times at Which TCKI and VL Reach the Transition Values in Current Status Tree F.0.2 
Accident 
Management 
Condition 
Three accumulators 
Two accumulators 
One accumulator 
No accumulators 
Time (s) When 
RVLIS < 40% 
6421 
6421 
6421 
6421 
Time (s) When 
rCET > 649.13 K 
9198 
6624 
6631 
6628 
Time (s) When 
r C E T > 921.93 K 
11223 
8911 
7217 
6 880 
Transition 
Time to 
EOP FR C.l 
(s) 
9198 
6624 
6631 
6628 
Damage 
Without 
EOP FR C.l 
(s) 
12928 
9784 
8051 
7157 
Damage with 
EOP FR C.l 
Transition 
(s) 
— 
— 
7172 
TABLE VIII 
Proposed Modifications to Status Tree F.0.2 
Current status tree F.0.2 
Mod 1 
Mod 2 
Mod 3 
Modification 
None 
Change level condition from 40% to 70%. 
Eliminate TCKI condition in EOP FR C. 1 
transition. 
Eliminate rCET condition in EOP FR C. 1 
transition, and change level condition 
from 40% to 70% (level below hot legs; 
see Fig. 15). 
Conditions to EOP FR C. 1 Transition 
rCET > 921 K or (rCET > 649.13 K and VL < 40%) 
rCET > 921 K or (TCET > 649.13 K and VL < 70%) 
VL < 40% 
VL < 70% 
only the case with no accumulator available could lead to 
core damage (PCT > 1477 K); see Fig. 37. However, in 
all cases, core uncovering was observed. Therefore, we 
analyze several modifications of Status Tree F.0.2 tran-
sition conditions in order to avoid core damage and core 
uncovering in all cases. 
Taking into account that RCPs are always tripped 
when the operator checks the condition 7CET 
> 649.13 K, 
as shown in Fig. 35, there are only a few possible FRG 
transition conditions to EOP FR C. 1 in the current Status 
Tree F.0.2; see Table VIII. The modifications proposed 
by the Universidad Politécnica de Madrid are similar to 
those proposed by several members of the OECD/NEA 
ROSA project; see Refs. 35 and 37. 
The transition time to EOP FR C.l can be obtained 
from the data shown in Table IX; see Table X. These 
transition times point out that it is necessary to simulate 
only the transients corresponding to Modification 2 
(Mod 2) and Modification 3 (Mod 3). 
The results of Mod 2 and Mod 3 point out that Mod 2 
gives better results than the current Status Tree F.0.2 (see 
Table XI), but Mod 2 and Mod 3 do not avoid core 
damage for the case of no accumulators nor do they avoid 
core uncovering in the other cases; see Figs. 39 and 40. 
On the other hand better results are obtained with Mod 3 
because core damage is avoided for the case of no accu-
mulators; core uncovering is also avoided in the other 
cases; see Figs. 41 and 42. Therefore, the only modifi-
cation of interest could be Mod 3, but one should take 
into account that this management action (three PORVs 
fully opened) is very aggressive and the cooling rate of 
the primary side could be very large. Additionally and 
according to some references, the operator behaviour must 
be conservative, and decisions must be based on more 
TABLE IX 
Times at Which TCKI and VL Reach the Transition Values in the Current Status Tree F.0.2 and Proposed Modified Versions 
Accumulator (s) 
Available 
Three accumulators 
Two accumulators 
One accumulator 
No Accumulators 
Time (s) When 
RVLIS < 70% 
5721 
5721 
5721 
5721 
Time (s) When 
RVLIS < 40% 
6421 
6421 
6421 
6421 
Time (s) When 
rCET > 649.13 K 
9198 
6624 
6631 
6628 
Time (s) When 
r C E T > 921.93 K 
11223 
8911 
7217 
6 880 
TABLE X 
Time of Transition for Each FRG (EOPs FR C.l and FR C.2) 
Modifications in Status Tree F.0.2 
Current Status Tree F.0.2 
Mod 1: Change RVLIS setpoint to 70%. 
Mod 2: Eliminate TCKI < 649 K condition. 
Mod 3: Change RVLIS setpoint to 70%, 
and eliminate rCET < 649 K condition. 
Transition to 
EOPFRC. l (s) 
Three Accumulators 
9198 
9198 
6421 
5721 
Transition to 
EOPFRC. l (s) 
Two Accumulators 
6624 
6624 
6421 
5721 
Transition to 
EOPFRC. l (s) 
One Accumulator 
6631 
6631 
6421 
5721 
Transition to 
EOPFRC. l (s) 
No Accumulators 
6628 
6628 
6421 
5721 
TABLE XI 
Peak Cladding Temperature for Each Case 
Three accumulators 
Two accumulators 
One accumulator 
No accumulators 
PCT at - 5 5 K/h 
(K) 
2063 
>3000 
>3000 
>3000 
PCT with FR-C.l 
(K) 
696 
790 
864 
2192 
PCT with Mod 2 
(K) 
620 
634 
710 
2005 
PCT with Mod 3 
(K) 
620 
620 
620 
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than just vessel level measurement; see Refs. 64 and 65 
for more details on this issue. 
XI. CONCLUSIONS 
The main conclusions of this research are the 
following: 
1. With the actual procedures (Westinghouse de-
sign), only the case with HPSI failed and no accumula-
tors available could lead to core damage. This conclusion 
has been obtained taking into account the correction of 
the simulated CET temperatures. This correction has been 
performed considering the most conservative relation-
ship among the experimental data and several simulated 
cases. This kind of conservative correction could avoid 
the necessity of more detailed codes. 
2. Changing the RVLIS condition (from 40% to 70%) 
and eliminating the CET condition in the EOP FR C.l 
transition lead to better results than those with present 
transitions to EOP FR C.l. However, it should be taken 
into account that this management action (three PORVs 
fully opened) is very aggressive and the cooling rate of 
the primary side could be very large. 
At present, it does not seem necessary to change 
Status Tree F.0.2 for the Westinghouse PWR design, be-
cause such change is useful only for SBLOCA accidents 
with HPSI failed and no accumulators available. Also, it 
must be taken into account that the full opening of three 
PORVs is a very aggressive management action and does 
not seem to be necessary in other accidents with higher 
probability, like SBLOCA with HPSI failed and one or 
more accumulators available. 
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